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The first appearance of the term ‘fictitious capital’ in Volume III of Capital is 
in the heading of Chapter 25 (‘Credit and Fictitious Capital’), yet curiously the 
term itself appears only twice in the main body of the chapter and on neither 
occasion is it Marx himself speaking. The first occasion is an excerpt from the 
Yorkshire banker Leatham who, as early as 1840, discusses the humungous 
circulation of bills of exchange, adding that this was what today we might call 
a completely unregulated market. ‘The bills of exchange are not placed under 
any control, except by preventing the abundance of money, excessive and low 
rates of interest and discount, which create a part of them, and encourage their 
great and dangerous expansion.’ ‘It is impossible to decide’, Leatham continues, 
‘what part arises out of real bona fide transactions, such as actual bargain and 
sale, or what part is fictitious and mere accommodation paper, that is, where 
one bill of exchange is drawn to take up another running, in order to raise a 
fictitious capital, by creating so much currency. In times of abundance and 
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cheap money this I know reaches an enormous amount’.1 So here fictitious 
capital is used to refer to accommodation bills (‘mere accommodation paper’), 
that is, those bills of exchange that were either purely speculative or part of 
an outright swindle. The second occurrence of fictitious capital in Chapter 25 
comes in a parenthesis inserted by Engels, who described the speculation in 
bills of exchange that involved massive over-trading to India and other parts 
of Asia (in 1847) as a ‘method of creating fictitious capital’ and a ‘fraudulent 
procedure’ to boot.2 Marx himself refers to this as ‘swindling in the East India 
trade, where bills were no longer drawn because commodities had been sold, 
but rather commodities sold in order to draw bills which could be discounted 
and converted into money’.3 For Marx this was a ‘credit swindle’, and he 
himself was careful to describe it simply as a ‘system of fictitious credit’, a 
method where ‘fictitious credit was created by means of accommodation bills’. 
(This in a piece he wrote for the New York Daily Tribune in 1858.) He states 
here, ‘The latter were discounted chiefly by joint-stock country banks, which 
rediscounted them with the London bill brokers. The London bill brokers, 
looking only to the endorsement of the Bank, not to the bills themselves, in 
their turn relied not upon their own reserves, but upon the facilities afforded 
to them by the Bank of England’.4
This introduction should hopefully have done three things. First it suggests 
that Chapter 25 is not where we should look for Marx’s understanding of 
fictitious capital, even if the chapter heading promises something in that 
direction. Second, that bills of exchange were pivotal to the nature of  Victorian 
capitalism. And third, that the financial system of the City involved an ‘entire 
interlocking system of London brokers, banks, discounting and accepting 
houses’ and, of course, the Bank of England.5 It was the Bank that stood behind 
the London bill brokers or discount houses, as they came to be called, and it 
was the Bank’s ‘last resort’ facility that in some sense sustained what Leatham 
had called the ‘enormous superstructure of bills of exchange’.
It is in Chapter 29 (‘Banking Capital’s Component Parts’) that we get a 
better sense of what Marx means by fictitious capital. Here he disaggregates 
banking capital into (i) cash (‘in the form of gold or notes’) and (ii) securities. 
The latter ‘may again be divided into two parts: commercial paper, current 
bills of exchange that fall due on specified dates, their discounting being the 
specific business of the banker; and public securities such as government bonds, 
1. Leatham, Letters on the Currency, cited in Marx 1981, p. 526. 
2. Engels apud Marx 1981, p. 537.
3. Marx 1981, p. 536.
4. Marx 1980a, pp. 35–6.
5. Mayhew 1999, p. 199.
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treasury bills and stocks of all kinds, in short interest-bearing paper, which is 
essentially different from bills of exchange’. And Marx adds, ‘Mortgages, too, 
can be included in this category’.6 Now the distinctive feature of this class of 
assets, the various types of interest-bearing paper that Marx refers to, is that 
they represent ‘claims, legal titles, to future production’,7 either a claim to 
‘certain sums from the overall proceeds of taxation’8 in the case of government 
bonds, treasury bills and so on, or a claim to a share of corporate profits. In 
either case, the capital value of these securities is purely fictitious, since it 
bears no relation to the actual determination of value in the production 
and circulation of commodities. Marx himself identified the formation of 
fictitious capital, that is, the peculiar determination of its market value, 
with capitalisation,9 but of course in modern financial markets the value at 
market prices of securities like credit default swaps and most derivatives has 
nothing to do with capitalisation in that sense. All the same, ‘the greater part 
of this “money capital” is purely fictitious’10 in the sense that its money value 
is, as Marx says, ‘completely fictitious’.11 ‘Their values can rise and fall quite 
independently of the movement in value of the actual capital to which they 
are [or more precisely, may be] titles’.12 The capital that is fictitious is money 
capital, and at the end of Chapter 30 Marx even suggests that fictitious capital is 
interest-bearing paper par excellence (more than bills of exchange).13 Two final 
points: fictitious capital circulates as money capital on the financial markets,14 
and, ‘In all countries of capitalist production there is a tremendous amount of 
so-called interest-bearing capital or “moneyed capital” in this form’.15 ‘In times 
of pressure on the money market . . . they [these securities] are put up for sale 
in massive quantities, to be converted into money’.16 ‘Their depreciation in a 
crisis is a powerful means of centralizing money wealth’,17 and Marx calls this 
a ‘devaluation of money capital’.18 
Let me come back to the bill of exchange by a rather circuitous route. The 
re-internationalisation of the City from the 1960s was bound up with the 
 6. Marx 1981, p. 594.
 7. Marx 1981, p. 599.
 8. Marx 1981, p. 609.
 9. Marx 1981, p. 597.
10. Marx 1981, p. 601.
11. Marx 1981, p. 600.
12. Marx 1981, p. 608.
13. Marx 1981, p. 625.
14. Ibid.
15. Marx 1981, p. 599.
16. Marx 1981, p. 598.
17. Marx 1981, p. 599.
18. Marx 1981, p. 635; cf. p. 650 ‘devalued securities’.
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rapid evolution of a new international money market, namely the Eurodollar 
market, the ‘founding stone of today’s international financial system’, as Gary 
Burn calls it – an ‘unofficial, unregulated and unrestricted international money 
market, dealing in ex-patriate dollar deposits held in a very liquid, short-term 
form’,19 a wholesale money market that led not just to the restoration of the 
City’s fortunes in the 1960s but, even more dramatically, to the re-emergence 
of global finance (which is the title of Burn’s book, as it happens). What the 
creation of the Eurodollar market did in the late fifties was provide the City 
with a ‘way of acting as a centre for international finance without imposing a 
strain on Britain’s depleted gold and currency reserves’.20 It was restrictions on 
the use of sterling that triggered ‘the great expansion of the Eurodollar market 
which took place towards the end of 1957’.21 What emerged was a ‘Merchant 
Bankers’ Market’ that ‘inherited a large part of its institutional structure and 
techniques from the City’s Victorian system for financing international trade’.22 
As Burn says, ‘The advent of the Eurodollar market finally allowed the City 
to regain its autonomy, lost in 1931’.23 But it is just as interesting, as he tells 
us repeatedly, that the institutional framework of that market was ‘borrowed 
from the Victorian London bill market, by City traders like Sir George Bolton’, 
suggesting an astonishing continuity in the structures of British capitalism.24
Bills of exchange drawn on London financed most of the world’s trade in the 
nineteenth century.25 Marx described the bill as the ‘basis of the credit system’ 
and in Volume III he even describes capitalism as a system of production ‘where 
the entire interconnection of the reproduction process rests on credit’.26 Bills of 
exchange could be ‘sold at a discount to face value in order to obtain immediate 
funds; and because they enjoyed such ready negotiability in the London bill (or 
discount) market’, they were an ideal means of financing world trade.27 ‘To 
make the bill of an overseas merchant . . . discountable on the London money 
market, a London merchant bank would put its signature on it, thus “accepting” 
(i.e. guaranteeing) it.’28 Accepting was a commission business controlled 
by leading merchant banks of the ilk of Barings and Schroders. These banks 
were also known as accepting houses. The Bank of England stood behind the 
19. Burn 2006, p. 16.
20. Burn 2006, p. 27.
21. Ibid.
22. Burn 2006, p. 101.
23. Burn 2006, p. 184.
24. Burn 2006, p. 186. Bolton’s views are best represented in Fry 1970. 
25. Mayhew 1999, p. 199.
26. Marx 1981, p. 621.
27. Kynaston 1995, p. 9.
28. McRae and Cairncross 1985, p. 7.
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bill-dealers or discount houses, ‘prepared in extremis to re-discount’ their better-
quality bills. ‘Because the Bank was prepared to do this, the houses were able 
to finance their massive bill portfolios with money that could be withdrawn 
virtually at a moment’s notice’,29 that is, from the call money market. With the 
phenomenal growth of deposit banking in Britain in the 1850s, the joint-stock 
banks began to employ an ‘increasing portion of their reserves at call with the 
City’s bill brokers (or dealers)’,30 and were willing to do so because the Bank 
of England ‘would be willing to discount the bills, in effect acting as lender of 
last resort’ to the dealers.31 ‘Relations between discount houses and joint-stock 
banks were intimate and continuous, for the bill brokers not only sold large 
lines of bills to the banks but borrowed substantial sums of money from them 
on a day-to-day basis’.32 
Now bills of exchange were used both to finance the trade in opium and 
as a means of remitting opium profits to Bombay, Calcutta and London. Till 
the early 1830s the most sought-after bills were those issued by the East India 
Company on Calcutta or on the Court of Directors in London.33 Of course, 
in addition to Company bills there was a vast volume of private paper in 
circulation.34 Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, almost certainly the biggest dealer in opium 
on the Indian side and a major client of Jardine Matheson & Co. (with whom, in 
the 1830s, he was transacting more than £1 million worth of business) remitted 
about £150,000 each year to London through China, thanks largely to the ‘good 
offices’ of William Jardine.35 As the late John F. Richards suggested, already by 
the 1820s ‘the greater part of private returns from the opium trade that returned 
to India went to the mercantile communities of western India, not Bengal’.36 
The huge volume of Malwa opium that flooded the Chinese market in the 
1830s was dominated by indigenous merchants – the opium lobbies in the 
so-called native states (in the western parts of present-day Madhya Pradesh) 
and the big dealers at the Bombay auctions.37 Bombay’s fortunes were built 
on opium, as Amar Farooqui argues in Opium City. When in 1831 the Company 
finally relented and allowed Malwa opium to be shipped through Bombay on 
payment of a transit duty, Jamsetjee ran a ‘massive combination’ to monopolise 
29. McRae and Cairncross 1985, p. 8.
30. Kynaston 1994, p. 181.
31. Kynaston 1994, p. 68.
32. Kynaston 1995, p. 294.
33. Farooqui 2006, p. 99.
34. Cheong 1974, p. 109.
35. Greenberg 1951, p. 164.
36. Richards 2002, p. 168.
37. Farooqui 2006, pp. 25ff. The involvement of Indian capital is discussed at length in Farooqui 
1998, Chapter 5, ‘Smuggled Malwa Opium and Indigenous Business Enterprise’. 
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the Malwa trade, seeking to have ‘as much of the supply as possible consigned 
to Jardine Matheson at Canton’.38 So successful was this combination, writes 
Asiya Siddiqi, that ‘at its height something like a third of the entire quantity of 
opium to leave the shores of Bombay was going to the warehouses of Jardine 
Matheson’ in China.39 As it happens, the leading houses in the China opium 
trade were also ‘by far the largest of the British traders in this period’.40 By the 
1860s Jardines were handling close to £300,000 worth of opium on commission 
each year, apart from investing heavily on their own account.41 
The ‘private English’ in China (an expression laced with irony, since there 
was a ‘preponderance of Scottish names’ among them) had the backing of 
the great East India Houses, a number of old and powerful firms in the City 
of London.42 Jardines’ list of merchant banking houses whose paper they 
endorsed included all the big names.43 Most of these ‘could be drawn on for 
large sums’. ‘With Fairlie & Bonham in London Jardine’s bills account doubled 
every year between 1827 and 1830’.44 The expansion of Britain’s Eastern trade 
‘was largely developed by family and clan groups’ organised as Agency Houses,45 
a congeries of fluid partnerships that in principle at least drew the bulk of their 
profits from agency commissions as opposed to ‘speculation’ or trading on 
their own account. All the agency houses depended on the ‘powerful support’ 
of City firms like Fairlie, who for their part competed vigorously to ‘grant 
acceptance credits on international commodity business’.46 Leading trading 
companies like James Finlay & Co. ‘could open any number of accounts for 
acceptance credits’. For example, in 1871 the Glasgow head office of this agency 
house ‘advised the Calcutta and Bombay branches that the Royal Bank of 
Scotland would cover acceptances to the extent of £100,000’, but Finlays also 
had accounts with the Bank of England and Baring Bros., while the Indian 
branch had their own accounts with the London merchant banks.47
Now Marx was thoroughly conversant with the nature of the bill market and 
how, for example, banks would create capital by reissuing bills of exchange48 or 
how the ‘London billbrokers carried on their enormous transactions without 
38. Siddiqi 1995, p. 198.
39. Siddiqi 1995, p. 199.
40. Jones 2000, p. 33.
41. Le Fevour 1968, p. 26.
42. Greenberg 1951, p. 34.
43. Cheong 1974, p. 115.
44. Cheong 1974, p. 114.
45. Greenberg 1951, p. 37.
46. Chapman 1992, p. 212.
47. Chapman 1992, pp. 212ff.
48. Marx 1981, p. 676.
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any cash reserve’,49 and how the East India trade tied in with the financial 
mechanisms of the City, periodically blurring the tenuous boundary between 
trade and speculation. He also knew that the East India Company had ‘rapidly 
convert[ed] the cultivation of opium in India, and its contraband sale to China, 
into integral parts of its own financial system’, as he had said in 1858.50 What is 
not there in Marx, at least in so many words, is a totalising picture of how the 
peasant hinterlands of British capitalism were integrated into the expansion of 
capital, whether that of the trading houses that were connected with the City 
or of industry itself. And opium is a good example to look at, not just because 
it was ‘probably the largest commerce of the time in any single commodity’, as 
Greenberg describes it,51 but because the hesitation that stopped Marx from 
proposing an integrated model of accumulation is reflected, crucially, in a 
passage that deals, precisely, with opium. Since this is a crucial passage, I shall 
cite it in full. 
In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), when discussing 
the decisive function of money as means of payment, Marx writes: 
In the transaction M – C, money as a real means of purchase may be alienated, 
thus realising the price of the commodity before . . . the commodity is handed 
over. This happens, for instance, in the well-known form of advance-payment; 
also in the form of payment used by the English government to buy opium from 
Indian ryots, and is largely used by foreign merchants living in Russia to buy goods 
produced in that country. In these cases, however, money functions only in the 
familiar form of means of purchase and therefore requires no new definition 
[keine neue Formbestimmtheit]. 
At this point Marx adds a footnote: ‘Of course capital, too, is advanced in the 
form of money and the money advanced [i.e. in these advance payments] may 
well be an advance of capital, but this aspect doesn’t lie within the scope of 
simple circulation’.52 In short, Marx is uncertain whether to treat the advances 
under which so-called Bengal opium was grown in India merely as a set of 
transactions between a mass of independent producers and their single 
buyer (the government) or as a circulation of capital. He knew that the opium 
monopoly or that part of it relating to the cultivation of poppy was based on 
a mixture of compulsion and enticement. The British government, he wrote, 
‘compels one part of the Indian ryots to engage in the poppy culture; entices 
49. Report of Committee on Bank Acts, 1857–8, cited in Marx 1981, p. 605.
50. Marx 1980b, p. 16.
51. Greenberg 1951, p. 104.
52. Marx 1980c, p. 201; Marx 1970, p. 140 (translation modified).
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another part into the same by dint of money advances’.53 This was a view 
abundantly supported by the evidence proffered to the Royal Commission 
on Opium as late as the 1890s. Bengal opium was grown in an elongated tract 
along the eastern Gangetic valley in present-day eastern Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar, and the bulk of the evidence cited below thus relates to this region. 
Poppy was grown in the richest fields of the village, on the rich loams, and 
needed constant care and labour for nearly five months down to the lancing 
of poppy heads and scraping of opium which took about a fortnight.54 ‘The 
cultivators are generally poor and they make the members of their families 
work hard’, said one clergyman, since cultivation of the poppy needed two or 
three times as much labour as the other spring crops. ‘Poppy is a crop specially 
suited to small holdings where a large return has to be gained by minute 
and laborious cultivation of a small area’.55 Nearly all the peasants engaging 
for opium with the state were either Kachhis or Koiris, sub-castes of skilled 
gardener-cultivators who ‘excelled in raising the specialist heavy crops of 
tobacco, vegetables, and opium’.56 The Sub-Deputy Opium Agents dealt directly 
only with the village headmen who in turn mobilised lists of cultivators willing 
to enter into the engagement to sow. New advances were disbursed at the end 
of September through these village intermediaries, and peasants sowing less 
than the area engaged for cultivation were liable to prosecution under Act 13 
of 1857.57 To the Opium Agents, that is, the government, what the cultivator 
entered into was a legal contract.58 Richards describes the rates paid per seer 
of crude opium as a ‘carefully calculated minimal monopoly price’, usually 4 or 
5 rupees a seer, much less in the early nineteenth century.59 There was solid 
testimony throughout the century that opium was cultivated at a great loss to 
the mass of those engaging for it.60 So why do they grow it?, the Commission 
asked one minor zamindar. ‘Because Government advances the money’, was 
his main response.61 The advances were a powerful inducement, because the 
vast mass of peasants in these parts of the country were tenants-at-will subject 
to the exactions of both landholders and money-lenders. ‘They could never 
pay their rents but for the opium receipts’, said one Sub-Deputy Opium Agent 
in the Bihar Agency. ‘As punctuality in the payment of revenue is rigorously 
53. Marx 1980b, p. 19.
54. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, p. 26.
55. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, pp. 277–8.
56. Whitcombe 1971, p. 32; Richards 1981, p. 72.
57. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, p. 92.
58. Ibid.
59. Richards 1981, pp. 73–4.
60. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, p. 27.
61. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, p. 138.
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enforced, they [the smaller landlords] would be in serious difficulty were it not 
for the opium advances to the ryots, upon which . . . the mahajans advance the 
instalments of rent payable to the zamindars’.62 The advances were interest-
free, that is, their sole purpose was to establish a legal claim on the peasant’s 
labour-time, which in practice meant a substantial quantity of unpaid family 
labour. 
Balls of crude opium were weighed and tested for adulteration around the 
middle of April, and the agreed rates paid only for the finest quality crude. 
The opium was then placed in earthen jars which were sealed and dispatched 
to the factory in consignments of a hundred.63 The manufacture of provision 
or export opium went on from May to the end of July. Opium from the Bihar 
factory contained 75% morphine, that from Bengal 71%, following a process 
called ‘alligation’, that is, mixing opium of different consistences. Opium cakes 
were then packed into chests of about 130–40lbs. at the rate of 500 chests a day, 
and these dispatched from the factory to Calcutta by special trains. The opium 
was then auctioned at Calcutta to private traders like Jardine Matheson when 
they traded on their own account.
Opium was India’s largest export item for most of the nineteenth century, 
her chief source of the large annual inflows of bullion from China,64 and the one 
commodity more than any other that financed a substantial part of the UK’s 
trade deficit. In the 1870s and 1880s, an average of over 90,000 chests or 5,700 
metric tons of opium left Indian ports every year. On the East India Company’s 
estimate the Chinese were importing ‘enough opium to supply over 2 million 
smokers’ in 1835.65 By the 1880s the massive escalation of exports from Calcutta 
and Bombay had triggered the emergence of domestic supply areas in the south 
and west of China,66 and the scale of consumption was certainly closer to the 
40 million smokers estimated by some scholars than the incredible figure of 
2 million cited by the head of the Imperial Maritime Customs in 1881.67 
William Jardine and James Matheson were both Whigs and strong advocates 
of a showdown with the Chinese authorities in the interests of securing what 
Jardine described to Palmerston as ‘liberty to trade with the northern parts’ 
of China, ‘if we can get it’.68 As early as 1834 James Matheson had denounced 
the new Foreign Secretary, the Duke of Wellington, as a ‘strenuous advocate of 
62. Royal Commission on Opium 1894a, p. 50.
63. Royal Commission on Opium 1894b, p. 321.
64. Richards 2002, p. 169.
65. Richards 2002, p. 163.
66. Zhang 2005, pp. 104–5. 
67. Trocki 1999, p. 91.
68. Blake 1999, pp. 90–1.
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submissiveness and servility’.69 Palmerston, who was Whig Foreign Secretary 
from April 1835 to September 1841, was altogether more sympathetic to the 
commercial interest at Canton. When the showdown finally came in 1839, 
Jardine was on his way back to Britain. Arriving in London in September, he 
went to see Palmerston and, as J.Y. Wong writes, ‘literally masterminded the 
government’s approach towards China and the Opium War, down to details 
such as the size of ships to be deployed and the terms of the treaty to be proposed 
to China, leaving blank only the names of the islands to be occupied and the 
amount of the indemnity to be exacted’.70 ‘Seldom has a private business had 
more effect on public policy’, notes Sir Robert Blake, the company’s biographer.71 
But Jardine was the epitome of a whole constellation of interests connected 
with the City, where of course he was ‘widely respected’.72 Those interests, and 
the peculiar nexus between the City and the Foreign Office, were even more 
strident in 1857 when the chief London firms connected with the China trade, 
some twenty in total, a deputation of literally hundreds of leading bankers, 
merchants, ship-owners, and brokers of Liverpool, and even Lloyds of London 
rushed into battle armed with ‘the strongest expressions of confidence in Lord 
Palmerston’.73 ‘To open China’ was the slogan under which the Arrow War was 
fought,74 ‘the same wild vistas of an immense extension of trade’, ‘dreams of 
an inexhaustible market’, as Marx commented with his usual dour realism a 
year later.75 In ‘The Figures of Descent’, a key argument of Anderson’s revolves 
around the notion of a disjuncture between the City and ‘nascent domestic 
industry’.76 If so, it certainly was not obvious in either of the Opium Wars when 
the Manchester associations were a vociferous part of the war lobby.77
All the same, Anderson’s general thesis that the nature of British capitalism 
has been irreducibly shaped by the ‘core operations of the City as a complex 
of British capital’ seems scarcely controversial to me.78 The only sector of 
manufacturing that has ever really mattered to the British state is Britain’s 
defence industry.79 When Sind was annexed in 1843 and the massive flows 
of Malwa opium deflected from Karachi to Bombay, the income from transit 
69. Blake 1999, p. 77.
70. Wong 1998, p. 311.
71. Blake 1999, p. 106.
72. ‘Widely respected’: Blake 1999, p. 114.
73. Wong 1998, pp. 219–21.
74. Wong 1998, p. 265.
75. Marx 1980b, p. 13.
76. Anderson 1987, p. 34.
77. Wong 1998, pp. 254–5, 310.
78. Anderson 1987, p. 69.
79. Edgerton 1991; Williams 2006, p. 201.
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duties alone could exceed £2–3 million in the 1860s.80 Britain’s occupation 
of Egypt in 1882 had more to do with the bondholders than any conceivable 
manufacturing interest. (‘The bondholders are now in possession of Egypt’, 
as the Radical writer Frederic Harrison said at the time.)81 The annexation of 
Upper Burma in 1885 was again linked to powerful commercial and financial 
interests connected both with the London Chamber of Commerce (headed, 
appropriately, by Charles Magniac of Mathesons) and with the Rothschilds.82 
Certainly, the 1880s were one of those ‘seasons of general self-delusion’, as Marx 
called them, when a plethora of capital gushed into every conceivable channel.83 
The City poured billions (in present-day terms) into South American securities, 
and its speculations in Argentina left Barings with liabilities that threatened to 
crash the entire financial system in 1890. As the City’s historian tells us, ‘Not 
only would the failure of the City’s leading accepting house inevitably bring 
down a host of other firms, including all the discount houses, but the very 
status of the bill on London would be threatened and thus the pre-eminence 
of the City as an international financial centre’.84 What Barings faced was a 
liquidity crisis, and the solution cobbled together over one tense week was a 
rescue package that coordinated infusions of capital from the government, the 
Bank, and the City. ‘Had Barings been allowed to collapse, most of the great 
London houses would have fallen with them’, Natty Rothschild is reported to 
have said. ‘About 6 millions’ worth of Bills are drawn daily upon London, and 
an enormous proportion of this business passed through their hands.’85 
Let me fast-forward by a century to a financial world that is vastly more 
complex and more integrated globally. It took barely a decade (say, 1987 to 
1997) for the American investment banks to break the entrenched positions 
of the UK merchant banks.86 In a final assault around the mid-1990s, ‘six of 
the City’s top investment banks were sold to overseas competitors in little 
more than eighteen months’.87 The British merchant banks were like Eric 
Santner’s ‘stranded objects’ in the high-octane world of the 1980s, when traders 
on the fixed income side started driving the profitability of Wall Street firms, 
and banks like Bear Stearns became major underwriters of mortgage-backed 
80. Wong 1998, p. 404, Table 16.10.
81. Kynaston 1994, p. 340.
82. Kynaston 1994, pp. 377ff.
83. Marx 1980a, p. 34.
84. Kynaston 1994, p. 429.
85. Kynaston 1994, p. 434.
86. Augar 2001, p. 75.
87. Augar 2010, p. 18.
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securities.88 Mortgage securities were bonds created out of pools of several 
thousand mortgages that entitled the bearer to a share of the cash flows from 
the pool. Securitisation creates fictitious capital and mortgage bonds were a 
good example of how the US investment banks could actively create markets 
for fictitious capital almost overnight. What was striking about the frenzy of 
innovation that seized the banking sector in the eighties and nineties was the 
sheer rapidity with which such markets were being created and expanded and 
tied into each other. Collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs) were created 
out of mortgage bonds which had been created out of mortgages, ‘synthetic’ 
CDOs were fabricated out of credit default swaps on different tranches of 
other CDOs. And credit default swaps preyed on a host of other markets, 
notably CDOs made up of subprime mortgages, and, more recently, the 
sovereign debt markets of the Eurozone. Credit default swaps are contracts 
that enable one side to hedge a long position. But hedgers need speculators to 
take the other side of the trade, and in 2006 when the total notional value of 
the CDS market hit $26 trillion (up from just $800 million in 2001), ‘well over 
half of CDS bets outstanding were pure speculation’ by people who did not 
even hold the underlying assets.89
In Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk LiPuma and Lee suggest 
that the over-accumulation of manufacturing capital in the US economy 
generated an abundance of speculative capital.90 The idea that an excess of 
speculation stems from a lack of profitability in the wider economy is of course 
an old one and is found in different guises in John Stuart Mill,91 Marx himself,92 
and Henryk Grossmann. In his classic work Grossmann argues that the 
plethora of capital that builds up as capitalism is increasingly characterised by 
an absolute over-accumulation of capital is released partly through the export 
of capital and partly by enormous bouts of speculation on the stock exchange.93 
These are the mechanisms by which a complete collapse of profitability is 
averted. These general determinations are fundamental, but it does not help 
to counterpose them (as Grossmann does)94 to Hilferding’s comments on 
speculation in a remarkable chapter of Finance Capital.95 Not only is financial 
speculation characterised by a massive use of leverage and by what he calls 
88. Cohan 2010, p. 250.
89. McDonald and Robinson 2009, p. 169.
90. LiPuma and Lee 2004, pp. 97ff.
91. Cited in Norfield 2012, p. 114.
92. Marx 1971, p. 122.
93. Grossmann 1970, pp. 530–72; Grossmann 1992, pp. 191–3.
94. Grossmann 1970, p. 536; Grossmann 1992, p. 191.
95. Hilferding 1985, Chapter 8, ‘The Stock Exchange’.
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‘the greatest possible rapidity of turnover’96 (what Marx in the Grundrisse calls 
‘circulation without circulation time’)97 but, no less importantly, speculation, 
says Hilferding, has an objective social function under capitalism, namely, 
to provide liquidity to the markets for fictitious capital, to keep them ‘open 
for business at all times’ and ‘so give money capital as such the possibility of 
transforming itself into fictitious capital, and from fictitious capital back into 
money capital’.98
These are massive and highly concentrated markets. ‘At year-end 2006 the 
top ten counterparties accounted for 89% of all CDS trades on a notional basis’.99 
The $72 trillion worth of credit default swaps outstanding in 2008 was held by 
17 banks, with Lehman holding $7 trillion of them.100 Or take this statistic: In 
the first quarter of 2010 the notional value of derivatives held by commercial 
banks in the US was $212.8 trillion. Of the 1,000-odd commercial banks that 
submitted information on their derivatives exposure, the top five claimed 97% 
of this notional value!101 
The global capital markets work on overnight loans. Unlike commercial 
banks, the investment banks do most of their funding overnight in the repo 
market, using the assets they hold as collateral. The collapse of the Bear 
Stearns hedge funds that triggered the first round of financial panic in June 
2007 was brought on by margin calls from the repo lenders, with some lenders 
like Lehman and Credit Suisse seizing collateral to sell into the market.102 The 
Bear hedge funds had a total of $11.1 billion in repo financing from 16 Wall 
Street firms.103 And of course the irony is, as William Cohan tells us, ‘the very 
same banks that were repo lenders to the funds were up to their eyeballs in 
the . . . same illiquid mortgage securities’ that the funds had.104 It was the 
evaporation of liquidity in the short-term money markets in the middle of 
2007 that signalled the emergence of a major crisis and forced the ECB to inject 
£95 billion into the overnight lending market. 
 96. Hilferding 1985, p. 144.
 97. Marx 1973, p. 659: ‘The necessary tendency of capital is therefore circulation without 
circulation time, and this tendency is the fundamental determinant of credit and of capital’s 
credit contrivances’; p. 671: ‘The tendency of capital is circulation without circulation time; hence 
also the positing of the instruments which merely serve to abbreviate circulation time as mere 
formal aspects posited by it . . .’; and pp. 630–1, where he refers to the ‘transition of capital from 
one phase to the next at the speed of thought’. 
 98. Hilferding 1985, p. 139.
 99. Wigan 2010, p. 119.
100. McDonald and Robinson 2009, p. 322.
101. Engelen, Ertürk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, Moran, Nilsson and Williams 2011, p. 61.
102. Cohan 2010, p. 425.
103. Cohan 2010, p. 238.
104. Cohan 2010, p. 415.
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Bear’s own collapse in the spring of 2008 was brought on by short sellers 
speculating in the credit default swap market and telling counterparties at 
other firms they had concerns about Bear’s liquidity and solvency, which drove 
the cost of spreads wider and made funding more expensive.105 By the fateful 
second week of March, Bear’s overnight lenders were all gone and the hedge 
funds had started pulling their prime brokerage accounts from the firm. On 
Thursday of that week (March 13) Bear went ‘from solvent to dead’ and was 
scooped up by JPMorganChase for $10 a share. 
The big winners in the crisis were Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan. There 
were many at Bear Stearns who believed that ‘Goldman fomented the negative 
sentiment and trading that doomed Bear Stearns in its final week’.106 Goldman 
‘supposedly bought puts, shorted Bear’s stock, and/or encouraged hedge funds 
to pull money from the firm’,107 or, in short, engineered a run on the bank. 
The demise of Lehman some months later, in September, was clinched by the 
extraordinary fact that the Federal Reserve agreed to expand the collateral 
that investment banks could pledge as part of its suddenly contrived rescue 
facilities but denied Lehman access to the discount window.108 ‘No public 
money’, Hank Paulson said at the time, yet ‘Paulson had no trouble putting 
billions of taxpayer dollars on the line for both Bear Stearns, six months earlier, 
and AIG, the giant insurer, two days later’.109 On 16 September 2008 ‘the federal 
government poured $85 billion of taxpayer money into AIG to keep it from 
falling into bankruptcy . . . and in effect took over the company’.110 The Federal 
Reserve gave the counterparties 100 cents on the dollar.111 AIG was brought 
down by its exposure to credit default swaps (since it was consistently on the 
wrong side of the trades), Bear and Lehman by their vast accumulation of 
assets that soon became worthless. The ‘ability to take short positions through 
the credit default swap market’112 was a major part of the way the banking 
crisis played out, for example, by allowing Goldman to become ‘significantly 
short’ the market by the end of January 2007 when the other banks were still 
collecting vast amounts of collateral to ram into their CDOs.113 Goldman’s net 
exposure to the mortgage market was virtually flat by March 2007.114 And by 
105. Cohan 2010, p. 15.
106. Cohan 2010, p. 539.
107. Cohan 2010, p. 559.
108. Cohan 2010, p. 526.
109. Cohan 2010, p. 559.
110. Cohan 2011, p. 589.
111. Cohan 2011, p. 590.
112. Stulz 2010, p. 76.
113. Cohan 2011, p. 507.
114. Cohan 2011, p. 540.
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April it was aggressively marking down its residual mortgage securities, with 
lethal consequences for other firms. 
Altvater has argued that credit default swaps are perfect instruments for 
speculation on defaulting sovereign debts, and indeed that speculators have 
been targeting the Eurozone ‘by attacking the weakest link in the chain in 
the European periphery’.115 There is now enough evidence to suggest that as 
countries move into distressed debt situations, ‘the bond market adjusts to the 
CDS market and not the other way round’.116 In other words, speculators in the 
credit default swap market exert a major influence on sovereign bond spreads, 
with the devastating consequences this has for the mass of the population in 
countries like Greece and Spain, and of course elsewhere as well. 
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